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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2257 
___________ 
 
ROBERT L. GARY, 
 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION; YVONNE AGUAYO, 
Human Relations Representative; KAABA BRUNSON, Human Relations 
Representative; CHARLENE NATCHER, Human Relations Representative; U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; MARIE M. TOMASSO, 
District Director 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 5-10-cv-01844) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 7, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 20, 2012) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Robert L. Gary, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District 
Court’s dismissal of his complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will summarily affirm.   
I. 
 In February 2008, Gary, an African-American male, worked for Holiday Inn as a 
“chamber maid” and “houseman.”  (Dkt. No. 6, ¶¶ 11-14.)  After his discharge in March 
2009, he applied for and was initially denied unemployment benefits because Holiday Inn 
failed to report a portion of his earnings.  (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.)  Because he then experienced a 
delay in receiving his benefits, Gary filed a charge of employment discrimination against 
Holiday Inn with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). (Id. ¶¶ 17, 
25-28.)  Several PHRC employees were involved in investigating his claim.  (Id. ¶¶ 30-
43.)  According to Gary, the PHRC employees purposely conspired to delay its 
resolution.  (Id. ¶¶ 45, 49.)  In August 2009, Gary received a notice that his charge of 
employment discrimination was sent to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) for “dual filing purposes.”  (Id. ¶ 50.)  Gary believed that, at that 
point, it was the EEOC’s responsibility to “take the lead” in handling his claim.  (Id. ¶ 
51.)   
 Dissatisfied with both the PHRC and the EEOC, Gary instituted this action in June 
2010.  He sought injunctive and equitable relief under various civil rights statutes, 
Pennsylvania law, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Id. p. 2 ¶ 1.)   
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 The PHRC defendants1 filed a motion to dismiss Gary’s complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for 
failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  (Dkt. No. 
10.)  The District Court granted it as unopposed and dismissed Gary’s complaint with 
prejudice as to the PHRC defendants.  (Dkt. No. 11.)  Gary appealed, but we determined 
that we lacked jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) because the 
claims against the EEOC defendants2
II. 
 remained in the case.  (Dkt. No. 33.)  The EEOC 
defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to 
state a claim, and improper service of process.  (Dkt. No. 38.)  The District Court granted 
it and dismissed Gary’s complaint with prejudice.  (Dkt. Nos. 43 and 44.)  Gary timely 
filed a notice of appeal. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district 
court’s dismissal for failure to comply with a procedural rule for abuse of discretion.  See 
Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  The standard of review over 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.  Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United 
States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  We also exercise plenary review over a motion 
                                              
1 The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, and Human Relations Representatives 
Yvonne Aguayo, Kaaba Brunson, and Charlene Natcher.   
 
2 The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and its District 
Director, Marie M. Tomasso.   
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to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Taliaferro v. Darby 
Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may summarily affirm the 
decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal.  3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
 A well-pleaded complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A complaint 
offering “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action” does not suffice.  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  The plausibility 
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct.  Id.  “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will 
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679.   
 We first turn to the District Court’s treatment of the PHRC defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.3
                                              
3 This case was initially assigned to Judge James Knoll Gardner and then transferred to 
Judge Juan Sanchez.   
  Gary did not respond to the motion within the time provided by the local rules.  
Thus, the District Court deemed it unopposed and, without any analysis under Rule 
12(b)(6), dismissed Gary’s complaint with prejudice as to the PHRC defendants.  (Dkt. 
No. 11.)   
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 We generally disfavor dismissal that is “a sanction for failure to comply with the 
local court rule.”  See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
Stackhouse, we held that motions to dismiss should not be granted without an analysis of 
the merits of the underlying complaint, notwithstanding local rules regarding the granting 
of unopposed motions.  Id.  Additionally, a district court must analyze the relevant factors 
set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), before 
concluding that the sanction of dismissal is warranted.  See Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 
908 F.2d 1142, 1148 (3d Cir. 1990).  While we have said that “some cases” could be 
dismissed as unopposed, “particularly if the party is represented by an attorney,” or if the 
party failed to comply with a court’s orders, Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30, that is not the 
situation here.  The District Court did not give Gary any notice that it was considering the 
sanction of dismissal for failure to comply with local procedure.  It was apparent that 
Gary intended to prosecute his case, given that he filed several motions for default 
judgment against all of the defendants prior to their filing motions to dismiss.  Further, 
the District Court did not undertake any analysis of the Poulis factors to establish that 
such a sanction was warranted.  Accordingly, we find that the District Court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Gary’s complaint for failing to oppose the motion to dismiss.     
 Nevertheless, we will summarily affirm on alternative grounds because Gary’s 
claims lack merit.  Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30; see also Johnson v. Orr, 776 F.2d 75, 83 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (“An appellate court may affirm a result reached by the district court 
on reasons that differ so long as the record supports the judgment.”).  As discussed 
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below, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Gary’s claims, and, in 
any event, Gary did not assert any plausible claims against the PHRC or the EEOC 
defendants. 
 A. The PHRC Defendants  
 Gary alleged that the PHRC defendants violated his constitutional and civil rights.  
However, the Eleventh Amendment “enacts a sovereign immunity from suit,” preventing 
actions in federal court against states, their agencies, and their employees acting in their 
official capacities.  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997).  
Pennsylvania has not consented to be sued in federal court.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat.  § 8521(b).  
As a state agency, the PHRC and its employees, acting in their official capacities, are 
entitled to sovereign immunity as to Gary’s federal claims, and they were properly 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984). 
 Gary also alleged that the PHRC defendants violated state law by engaging in 
willful misconduct, abuse of process, and failure to protect.  Under Pennsylvania law, the 
PHRC defendants are Commonwealth parties and therefore immune from suit, subject to 
nine limited categories of negligence where sovereign immunity is waived.  See 1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2310 (sovereign immunity exists in Pennsylvania unless specifically 
waived); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8501 and 8522(b) (defining Commonwealth parties and 
categories of negligence).  The PHRC defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity as 
to Gary’s state law claims because none of them fell within those enumerated exceptions.  
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Because the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims, 
they were also properly dismissed.  See CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 146-47 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 Additionally, Gary’s complaint lacked sufficient factual matter to state any claims 
against the PHRC defendants that were plausible on their face.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Gary alleged that the PHRC defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in their processing of 
his employment discrimination claim.  “[I]ntentional discrimination” on the basis of race 
“is a required element of a § 1981 claim.”  Hood v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 680 F.2d 
955, 959 (3d Cir. 1982).  Gary stated that he is African-American in his complaint, but he  
did not plead any facts that remotely suggested intentional or purposeful discrimination 
against him by the PHRC defendants.  If anything, it appears from Gary’s complaint that 
the PHRC defendants attempted to resolve his claim in a manner satisfactory to him, by 
“assigning [their] best representative” to help him.  (Dkt. No. 6, ¶ 33.) 
 Gary also alleged that the PHRC defendants engaged in a racially-motivated 
conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986.  
(Dkt. No. 6, ¶ 49.)  To properly plead such a claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a 
conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is 
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the 
United States.”  Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006).  Gary 
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alleged but one sentence to support his conspiracy claim, that is, that certain PHRC 
employees “along with the commission are conspiring to hinder the relief sought by the 
plaintiff.”  (Dkt. No. 6, ¶ 45.)  Such a conclusory statement, absent any factual basis, is 
insufficient to set forth a plausible claim for relief.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  Absent a 
valid § 1985(3) claim, Gary’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 fails, as liability under that 
statute is predicated on actual knowledge of a § 1985 violation.  See Clark v. Clabaugh, 
20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994) (transgressions of § 1986, by definition, depend on a 
preexisting violation of § 1985).  
 Gary alleged that the PHRC defendants violated his Thirteenth Amendment right 
to be free from slavery.  Nothing in Gary’s complaint supports this claim.   He also 
alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights were 
violated.  To prevail on a due process claim, Gary must have alleged the existence of a 
protected liberty interest, which he failed to do.  See Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d 946, 949 
(3d Cir. 1984) (threshold question in determining due process violation “is whether there 
is a protected interest at issue”).  Gary’s claim that his equal protection rights were 
violated requires “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.”  Antonelli v. New 
Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005).  Again, Gary’s complaint contained no 
allegations to support that the PHRC defendants acted with such intent.   
 B. The EEOC Defendants  
 Gary’s allegations against the EEOC defendants stemmed from his belief that they 
should have investigated or processed his charge of discrimination.  He asserted 
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substantially the same claims against the EEOC and its District Director, in her official 
and individual capacities, as he did against the PHRC defendants.   
 The District Court properly determined that Gary’s claims against the EEOC 
defendants should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.4
 Further, in order to state a Bivens action against the District Director in her 
individual capacity, Gary needed to allege that she deprived him of a constitutional right 
while acting under color of federal law.  Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Gary alleged only that the District Director signed a letter informing him 
that his charge was received by the EEOC.  (Dkt. No. 6, ¶ 50.)  We agree with the District 
Court that Gary’s allegations against her did not contain sufficient factual matter to state 
a plausible claim (Dkt. No. 43, pp. 8-9).  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.  Finally, to the extent 
that Gary asserted a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), that claim was 
properly dismissed because the FTCA authorizes suits only against the United States 
  Absent waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields United States government agencies and their employees, acting in their official 
capacities, from suit.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  
Because sovereign immunity is “jurisdictional in nature,” the District Court properly 
dismissed Gary’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.   
                                              
4 The EEOC defendants also argued improper service of process, but the District Court 
did not reach that issue as it dismissed Gary’s complaint on other grounds.   
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itself, not individual defendants or agencies.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  The District Court 
therefore properly dismissed all of Gary’s claims against the EEOC defendants. 
III. 
 Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will summarily 
affirm the dismissal of Gary’s complaint with prejudice.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6.   
 
